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INTRODUCTION 
As the editors of this volume note in their introductory chapter, collaboration is inherent in any 
operating market economy, and collaboration is, of course, sought because of the advantages it 
yields relative to non-collaboration. At the most abstract level, ―collaboration‖ simply means ―non-
autarcic‖; thus, Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises (1936) saw the division of labor as 
organized under capitalist institutions as a primary example of peaceful collaboration. Less 
abstractly, collaborative advantage may be related to notions of social capital and generalized trust. 
Still, such understandings capture a very large part of extant social science research. A more narrow 
understanding of collaborative advantage is required, lest we merely engage in an unproductive 
relabeling game. In fact, starting with important contributions by, for example, Hirschman (1970) 
and Richardson (1972), modern writers associate collaborative advantage with (typically) long-
lasting and stable relations between actors, supported by informal trust relations, relations based on 
formal contracts or property rights, or some combination thereof (Lazzarini, Miller & Zenger, 
2004). The relevant actors may exist at different analytical levels (e.g., individuals, firms, dyads, 
industries, clusters, regions, nations) and may in turn be embedded in various formal and informal 
institutions (North, 1990), as well as in certain geographical contexts.  
 However, even this conceptual narrowing of the notion of collaborative advantage still 
implies that we are making reference to very large and still expanding literatures in (fields in) 
economics (e.g., economic geography, urban economics, trade theory) and sociology, as well as 
management fields, such as strategic management, international business, and innovation studies. In 
various field and discipline-specific ways, these examine the morphology of collaboration and 
collaborative advantage, and seek to identify their antecedents and consequences. Methods differ, 
ranging from longitudinal single case studies to multi-level panel data studies using state of the art 
econometrics. Not surprisingly, it is far from clear that what is effectively a jumble of contributions 
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actually adds up to robust generalizations and insights. Parts of extant work on collaboration and 
collaborative advantage is nicely summarized in the editors‘ introductory chapter. 
 In this chapter we argue that because there are so few obvious constraints on the meaning of 
collaboration on the social domain, and because it is mixed up with fundamental multi-level issues, 
both with respect to conceptualization, antecedents and consequences, clarity and rigor with respect 
to construct definition, location of constructs at various analytical levels, and methods is absolutely 
essential. For example, while collaborative advantage may be well-defined at the level of firm 
dyads (Richardson, 1972; Williamson, 1985; Dyer & Wilkins, 1993), it may be (in fact, is) less well 
defined at higher levels of analysis, such as industries or industrial districts. Or, collaborative 
advantage at these latter levels may actually mean something different from collaborative advantage 
at the dyadic level, and have different antecedents and consequences. For example, as the notion of 
collaborative advantage traverses levels of analysis, antecedents likely differ (Nielsen, 2010).  
 As these examples suggest, many of the difficulties of researching collaboration and 
collaborative advantage stem from the multi-level nature of these constructs themselves, as well as 
from the fact that their antecedents and consequences may be located at multiple different levels. 
For instance, with respect to antecedents, dyad-level collaborative advantage (e.g., superior 
innovation resulting from pooling innovation capabilities in specific projects) may arise from 
particularly skilled R&D personnel or alliance managers; the firms‘ endowments of innovation 
capabilities or their experiences from previous R&D collaboration; advantages accruing to the 
specific region they are located in; governmental support programs; broad societal institutions; etc. 
Thus, collaborative advantage may have antecedents on lower (‖micro‖) as well as higher 
(‖macro‖) analytical levels (Knudsen & Nielsen, 2010). In fact, one of our key points in the 
following is that researching collaborative advantage inherently requires a multi-level approach. 
Theoretically, account must be made of antecedents and consequences at different levels, as well as 
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potential cross-level effects. In extant research, this is often not done; for example, research on 
national systems of innovation (e.g., Lundvall, 1992) often makes no reference to firms whatsoever 
(which logically must be part of the micro-foundations of such systems). By the same token, little 
effort has been devoted to defining the level at which constructs operate and little theory 
development within the strategic alliance field explicitly addresses the role played by variables at 
different levels (Nielsen, 2010). Proper—multilevel—empirical research methods must be adopted; 
otherwise, relevant causes are not identified and/or estimated parameters become biased.  
 Accordingly, this chapter offers a condensed primer on multi-level conceptual and 
methodological issues pertaining to collaborative advantage in order to guide future research. 
Rather than striving to be all-encompassing, we focus our discussion on a particular type of 
collaboration—strategic alliances among independent business firms—as this area of research 
continues to play a central role in strategic management, international business and organizational 
science. Despite this focus, most of the ensuing discussion applies equally well to other kinds of 
collaborations and we draw parallels to these where relevant.  A further limitation is that we restrict 
our inquiry to variable-centered theoretical and empirical inquiry, and as such do not touch upon 
collaborative advantage in the context of small-N research, such as narrative approaches or 
approaches relying on comparative case method. 
COLLABORATIVE ADVANTAGE: MEANING 
Construct Clarity 
 Constructs are among the fundamental building blocks of theories, and clear constructs are 
necessary (if insufficient) for good theorizing. Thus, clear constructs make it easier to coordinate 
and disseminate research efforts because clarity facilitates communication. This promotes the 
growth of knowledge. Clarity also eases empirical work, by making it easier to identify proper 
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sample frames, reducing concerns with construct validity, etc. As Suddaby (2010: 347) explains, 
there are four basic elements of arriving at clear constructs—namely,  
1. providing definitions which involves ‖the skillful use of language to persuasively create 
precise and parsimonious categorical distinctions between concepts‖ (p.347);  
2. identifying scope conditions that delineate the circumstances under which the concept 
meaningfully applies;  
3. clarifying semantic relationships to other related constructs (as constructs do not arise de 
novo, but build on other, existing constructs); and, finally,  
4. demonstrating the logical consistency or coherence of the construct in relation to the 
overall theoretical argument being made.  
 Constructs do not come ready made with clear definitions, properly delineated scope 
conditions, etc. While a significant part of scientific activity is establishing causal links between 
constructs (i.e., theorizing) and testing the resulting propositions, sorting out definitional issues, 
scope conditions, semantics, etc. issues constitute a quite significant and important part of scientific 
activity, not the least in the social sciences.  
 To illustrate with a highly relevant construct, ‖competitive advantage‖ has been around in the 
strategic management field, one of the major management fields, for at least four decades. It is 
conventionally taken to be the central construct of the field, and as such it is a construct that serves 
to organize research efforts in the field. For example, ‖strategies‖ are often conceptualized as plans 
regarding how to achieve competitive advantage. However, it remains a fact that it is only quite 
recently that this central, organizing construct has been properly clarified in terms of precise 
definitions and scope conditions (Peteraf & Barney, 1993).
1
 For example, much strategic 
                                                          
1
 Given the huge success of the strategic management field, this suggests that fields can in fact flourish even in the 
presence of considerable conceptual ambiguity. Thus, conceptual clarity should not be taken as a necessary condition of 
scientific progress. However, the counterfactual argument may be made that had the strategic management field (as well 
as other fields and disciplines that have fuzzy concepts at the heart of their analytical enterprise) adopted clearer key 
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management literature (still) discusses competitive advantage in terms of financial success 
(properly an outcome of competitive advantage) and conceptualizes it relative to suppliers and 
buyers (rather than only competitors). If a relatively established concept that has served to organize 
research efforts in an influential field for four decades can be fraught with lack of definitional and 
scope clarity, we should not be surprised to see more recent constructs also being characterized by 
lack of clarity, etc. We argue that this is, in fact, the case with collaborative advantage.  
Collaborative Advantage 
 ‖Collaborative advantage‖ is clearly a recent construct. It appears that the construct was first 
coined in the beginning of the 1990s, specifically in Kanter‘s (1994) Harvard Business Review 
article, where she coins and uses the concept to refer to the specific advantages that may accrue to 
firms that set up strategic partnerships with other firms (e.g., joint ventures) by virtue of such 
cooperation. Another early inventor/adopter of the construct is Huxham (1996), who uses the 
construct generically to refer to any advantage to any kind of collaboration, apparently at any level 
of analysis (cf. also Huxham & Vangen., 2005).
2
 Subsequently, the construct appears to have 
mainly been applied in the context of work on strategic alliances written for the popular business 
book market (e.g., Dyer, 2000; Lanter, 2005). Use of the Google Scholar search engine confirms 
that the construct does not enjoy widespread use in the academic journals, although it obviously 
connects to a very broad set of established social science and management constructs and ideas. 
 Given this context of the construct, it is, perhaps, not surprising that no rigorous definitions of 
the construct have been forwarded. Writers usually rest content with providing illustrative examples 
of collaborative advantage, examples that somehow suggest that partners to some venture may 
realize advantage that accrue to them by virtue of their specific collaboration. This is so broad as to 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
constructs earlier, it would have progressed even more. We submit that the same applies in the case of collaborative 
advantage.  
2
 At any rate, using internet search tools, we have not been able to locate earlier uses of the construct. 
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make the construct almost devoid of content, and illustrates what Suddaby (2010: 348) calls the 
―most common error in developing constructs … making them too general.‖  
 Moreover, because of the potentially extreme inclusiveness of the collaborative advantage 
construct, it may seem hard to say anything meaningful about approaches to researching 
collaborative advantage, the main purpose of the present chapter. Thus, if collaborative advantage 
can, in principle, be applied to any level of analysis—that is, the dependent variable ―collaborative 
advantage‖ can meaningfully be postulated at any level ranging from the level of collaborating 
individuals to collaborating nations—, basic problems regarding the nature of the explanans (i.e., 
the independent variables and how they are causally related) emerge: It is highly unlikely that the 
theoretical explanation sought for explaining collaborative advantage at one level is isomorphic 
with the explanation sought for explaining collaborative advantage at a different level. The 
explanatory (independent) variables likely differ, and the same variables may be causally related in 
different ways, depending on which level an explanation is sought. This means that there can be no 
unified theory of collaborative advantage; merely an ensemble of theoretical accounts of 
collaborative advantage at different analytical levels. Such incoherence is hardly desirable.  
 In fact, however, the extant literature on strategic alliances in management research, as well as 
basic notions from economics, allow us to go further and be more specific. Specifically, we propose 
the following components of a more precise understanding of collaborative advantage.  
Advantage. We follow the strategic management literature and define ―advantage‖ as a 
relative construct, namely the potential to create and capture more value than the relevant 
competition over some specified time-frame. From a theoretical perspective, one may assume that 
actors can be completely ordered on the basis of the extent to which they enjoy advantage.   
Collaborative advantage (definition). Given the relative nature of advantage, collaborative 
advantage must imply that we are dealing with potential super-normal gains from trade; 
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specifically, because of its collaborative activities a firm is capable of creating and capture more 
value than other meaningfully comparable firms. The latter category includes competitors within an 
industry (or a strategic group) as well as potential competitors (i.e., firms that are currently outside 
of the industry or the strategic group). The relevant potential super-normal gains from trade may 
stem from collaboration in the horizontal dimension, as when firms collaborate with competitors or 
complementors. Or, they may stem from collaboration in the vertical dimension, such as close 
relations to supplier firms or customers. These cases are obviously analytically different, and policy 
and strategy implications differ. However, space considerations prohibit a discussion of these 
issues. Suffice it to note that the relevant exchange that underlies collaborative advantage must go 
beyond ordinary spot-market exchange which is in principle open to any actor, and which, 
therefore, will not confer any advantage. Thus, collaborative advantage typically involves longer 
term relations between non-anonymous parties who participate in a venture where they pool 
complementary resources or the services of such resources in order to reach some shared goal. The 
paradigm example of this is the mutual conferment of specific investments to a relation, intensely 
studied in transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1996).  
Locus of collaborative advantage. Given our association of advantage with (potential) 
appropriable value creation, we are dealing with actors who interact in markets, since appropriable 
value creation is only well-defined for such actors. This implies that we exclude collaboration 
between, for example, public utilities that do not interact on a market. We primarily associate 
collaborative advantage with firms, and locate such advantage at the firm level.  
Often notions of advantage are transferred from the level of firms to higher level entities, such 
as regions (Storper, 1992) or even nations (e.g., Porter, 1990). The basic idea is that traded and un-
traded interdependencies (i.e., pecuniary and non-pecuniary externalities) may be geographically 
circumscribed, and accessible to ―insiders‖ at significantly lower cost than to ―outsiders‖ (Foss & 
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Eriksen, 1995). These interdependencies—which span multiple resource categories, such as 
abundant supply of advanced engineering services, trust relations, information flows, etc. —in 
effect become a kind of club goods (Buchanan, 1965). Writers often discuss industries, districts, 
regions, etc. characterized by such interdependencies as possessing advantage. While certain 
resources of a collaborative kind indeed arise in the interaction between firms, and as such in a 
certain sense lie outside of the boundaries of the firm (e.g., generalized trust relations in industry), 
the fact remains that firms are the loci of advantage, and of the value creation and appropriation that 
such advantage may give rise to. That this may benefit, for example, a region is obvious; however, 
the benefit emerges because the value creation that collaborative advantage may give rise to is 
appropriated by firms, and subsequently split between the multiple stakeholders of the relevant 
firms, many (most) of which are likely to be located in the region. We question whether it makes 
sense to say that the region as such can hold a collaborative advantage.  
Antecedents of collaborative advantage. The antecedents of collaborative advantage include 
improved knowledge of the partner and of the opportunities that may be realized through 
collaboration (learning economies); and the building of trust; scale and scope advantages from the 
pooling of complementary resources etc. More generally, the ability to perform better in 
(subsequent) collaborations is typically conceived to be embedded in repetitive organizational 
activities that a firm develops in order to deploy its resources in collaborations (Helfat & Peteraf, 
2003). One may argue that, for example, ―improved knowledge of the partner‖ is mainly located at 
the individual level, for example, in the memory of alliance managers, CEOs, etc. Thus, antecedents 
of collaborative advantage may, therefore, also exist at the level of individuals, in concert with 
strategic and structural levels (Knudsen & Nielsen, 2010). Related, antecedents may exist at higher 
levels, for example, at the level of industries (Foss & Eriksen, 1995). 
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Scope conditions. As Suddaby (2010: 348) argues, in contrast to the ―physical sciences, few 
constructs in organization theory have universal application.‖ Indeed, much organizational theory is 
―middle-range theory‖ (Merton, 1968), that is, theory that only applies to a small set of 
phenomena/dependent variables, often only one. For example, research developed for the purpose 
of understanding certain aspects of a large, vertically integrated and publicly traded firms may not 
be relevant for understanding entrepreneurial upstart firms.
3
 In this case, the scope of theory is 
limited in the horizontal dimension because the theory applies to (the level of) firms, but only to a 
subset of firms.   
Multilevel researchers argue that there is also a vertical dimension to the scope of a theory. 
Indeed, the notion of the ―level of theory‖ refers to the focal unit or target at a given level (e.g., firm 
or dyad) that a researcher aims to explain, that is, ―it is the level to which generalizations are made‖ 
(Rousseau, 1985: 4).  The focal unit, in turn, determines the appropriate level associated with key 
constructs of interests.  Typically, collaborative advantage is realized in small-numbers interaction 
(Williamson, 1985), such as joint ventures, strategic alliances, consortia or the like, and typically 
involve some specific and complementary assets. In these cases, the relevant levels of theory are 
those of the participating firms as well as the (dyadic) level of their collaborative activity.  
As we suggested above, there are cases in which quite a large number of actors collaborate as 
a group and arguably hold advantages relative to outsiders because they participate in a network 
(region, industry, etc.) that goes significantly beyond the dyad. In such cases, it may be meaningful 
to consider an additional level of theory, namely the level of the network as a whole. Writers who 
argue that firms can benefit from participating in ―clusters‖ (Porter, 1990) or ―national systems of 
innovation‖ (Lundvall, 1992) or that industry membership provides access to specific ―industry 
capabilities‖ (Foss & Eriksen, 1995) implicitly or explicitly work with such a multi-layered 
                                                          
3
 This is not to say that there is no ‖grand theory‖ in organizational theory. Clearly, transaction cost economics aspires 
to this (Williamson, 1996). 
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framework.  Yet, only to the extent that the dependent variable is theorized at the network or cluster 
level (e.g., studies of how national systems of innovation or industry clusters compete with other 
similar types of networks) is the level of theory at this higher level. As we have indicated, we think 
there are reasons to be skeptical of claims that collaborative advantage itself is meaningfully placed 
at such levels; however, antecedents of collaborative advantage may well be located here.  
Level of measurement refers to the actual source of the data, which should correspond to the 
level of constructs in order to increase the variability predicted by the theory.  For instance, if the 
theory specifies within-group heterogeneity (e.g., in multi-level terminology, ―alliances nested 
within firms‖, Nielsen, 2010), data collection should be conducted at the alliance level in order to 
ensure conformity with the theory and preserve the heterogeneity of the data within alliances. In 
such cases, collaborative advantage must by operationalized and measured as alliance-level 
advantages from collaborative efforts; for instance by focusing on the interactions between the 
partners to each specific alliance. 
Finally, the level of analysis is concerned with the unit to which data are assigned and how 
data are treated during (statistical) analysis.  The level of analysis must be aligned with the level of 
theory and measurement in order to appropriately assess the nested sources of variability.  To the 
extent that collaborative advantage is theorized and measured as a firm-level construct that confers 
upon the holding firm some kind of advantage in (subsequent) interfirm dealings, the level of 
analysis should remain at the firm level as any aggregation or disaggregation runs the risk of 
influencing correlations and regression coefficients as well as potentially distorting the meaning of 
the data altogether. 
MULTILEVEL ISSUES, INTERFIRM RELATIONS,  
AND COLLABORATIVE ADVANTAGE  
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Many discussions in the organizational literature lack attention to levels in general and micro-
foundations in particular (see Abell, Felin & Foss, 2008; Dansereau, Yammarino & Kohles, 1999; 
Felin & Foss, 2005). Despite the growing use of collaborative alliances in a wide variety of settings, 
much of the organizational literature still focuses primarily on a single level of theorizing; typically 
the firm. The application of diverse theoretical approaches, such as resource dependence theory, 
microeconomics and strategic management, identify specific (industry or firm level) preconditions 
for collaboration and use these to predict organizational outcomes. However, they do so without 
regard to the underlying micro-foundational mechanisms which condition these outcomes.  
 Grounded in various theoretical perspectives and disciplines, such as transaction cost 
economics, social exchange theory, resource based view, evolutionary theory, industrial 
organization, and institutional theory, alliance research spans multiple levels (Nielsen, 2010). Yet 
many theories do not specify the mechanisms through which concepts at various levels are related, 
but are effectively mono-level theories (e.g., capabilities theories in strategic management) (Abell, 
Felin & Foss, 2008). While some studies attempt to integrate theories, they typically do so without 
considering the level of conceptualization and generalization of these theories (e.g., Heimeriks, 
Duysters & Vanhaverbeke, 2007; Lee & Park, 2008).  This often leads to mixing of constructs from 
different theoretical levels without the specification of cross-level relationships, and/or making 
predictions and testing propositions at a level that does not correspond to the underlying theory. 
Multilevel theory development can help integrate such theories operating at different levels 
and specify the links between concepts from different levels of analysis that is multi-level theory 
explicates level-connecting mechanisms. In particular, interactions between factors at different 
levels offer potential avenues for advancing strategic alliance research and hold the potential for 
greatly improving theorizing about strategic alliance formation, dynamics and performance. 
Collaborative advantage, whether it is conceptualized as an antecedent variable in models of 
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alliance (or firm) performance or acts as the dependent variable, constitutes one such concept which 
needs to be theorized, measured and analyzed through a multilevel lens.  
Despite the pluralism of foundational theories invoked to examine collaborative interfirm 
relationships, explanations of collaborative advantage rests on a foundation of methodological 
individualism. Although most researchers would agree that collaborative advantage is inherently 
multilevel in nature, existing research primarily studies the phenomena at a single level of analysis 
(e.g., firm or dyad/alliance) with little attention to other effects at different levels of analysis, as 
well as potential cross-level effects. According to Dyer and Singh (2004), collaborating firms can 
generate relational rents, defined as ―…a supernormal profit jointly generated in an exchange 
relationship that cannot be generated by either firm in isolation and can only be created through the 
joint idiosyncratic contributions of the specific alliance partners‖ (Dyer & Singh, 2004: 351–352). 
Relational rents are determined by 1) the degree of investments in relation specific assets; 2) the 
degree of knowledge exchange; 3) the extent to which complementary, but scarce, resources or 
capabilities are combined; and 4) the extent of effective governance mechanisms (Dyer & Singh, 
2004). The main components of the rent-yielding factors are related to firm-level structural factors; 
for instance, contractual governance mechanisms. However, relational rents also refer to the 
importance of more intangible aspects of co-operation, such as trust, reputation and goodwill, as 
well as potentially to individual level skills and competences (Knudsen & Nielsen, 2010). The 
existence of specific collaborative capabilities (resulting in a collaborative advantage) may help 
explain why some firms perform better than others when engaged in close collaboration activities as 
they ―develop superior capabilities at managing particular organizational forms such as alliances‖ 
(Kale, Dyer & Singh, 2002: 748). Yet, in order to adequately investigate the concept of 
collaborative advantage, a first step must be to clarify the concept in terms of level of theory and 
measurement.  
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Level of Theory and Measurement 
Multilevel theory rests on the ability of researchers to appropriately identify and define the 
focal units of a theory. When a focal unit of theoretical interest is identified, a multilevel theory can 
be developed and predictions can be made about how constructs at different levels are related to 
each other, and through which mechanisms (processes) (Hitt et al., 2007: 1388). Constructs are the 
building blocks of theory and the level of a construct is the level at which it is hypothesized to be 
manifest in a given model. Hence, it is paramount to define, justify and explain the level of each 
construct that constitutes a theoretical system. 
Collaborative advantage raises immediate concerns regarding the appropriate level of theory 
as the above discussion illustrates; while some aspects of collaborative advantage rests on the firm‘s 
ability to develop and leverage (firm-level) organizational routines, which are repetitive activities 
that a firm develops in order to deploy its resources more effectively and efficiently in (subsequent) 
alliances (Helfat and Peteraf, 2003; Nelson and Winter, 1982), other aspects relate to (interfirm-
level) relational attributes, such as development of trust, goal congruency and relational 
embeddedness (Krishnan, Martin & Noorderhaven, 2006; Nielsen, 2005). While the former studies 
draw on the resource-based view (RBV) and dynamic capabilities perspectives in arguing for firm-
level antecedents of collaborative capability, the literature on relational attributes of collaborative 
advantage, on the other hand, typically draws on social exchange theory, network theory or 
transaction cost economics to build theoretical arguments for the value-added of effective and 
efficient procedural and contractual governance of interfirm transactions. Moreover, individual 
skills and experiences may account for an essential part of the organizational memory and entail a 
set of repetitive activities ensuring a smooth and effective functioning of inter-organizational 
operations. The individual-level factors that contribute to collaborative advantage are thus related to 
the acquisition of new knowledge from external sources (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998). The employees 
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that are participating in collaborative activities where knowledge is sourced externally play an 
important role. This is emphasized in the work done on absorptive capacity where the role of 
‗gatekeepers‘ is pivotal. In their 1990 article, Cohen and Levinthal turned their attention towards the 
cognitive structures of the individuals of the organization and showed that in addition to being an 
organizational-level construct, absorptive capacity also exists at the individual level (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990, p.132). 
No single theory or paradigm is likely to provide an adequate foundation for a general theory 
explaining the antecedents and outcomes of collaborative advantage. For instance, while application 
of transaction cost economics (TCE) may be appropriate for studying the establishment and 
structuring of alliances, managerial processes leading to alliance outcomes may be better assessed 
by drawing on social exchange or learning theories. In addition, the applicability of each theory 
may depend on situation specific factors; for instance, the resource based view (RBV) may be more 
suitable to the study of collaborative advantage in dynamic industries, whereas institutional theory 
may be more relevant for collaborative advantage in international alliances than for purely domestic 
ones. As a result, explicit integration of theories that span different levels holds great potential for 
facilitating new theory generation and empirical developments in collaborative advanage research. 
A starting point for such theory generation is to clarify the focal unit of interest and the resulting 
role of collaborative advantage in the theoretical system.   
 
Nesting of collaborative advantage. The central theme of multilevel thinking is that 
organizational entities reside in nested arrangements and that more complete models of 
organizational phenomena must account for this nested structure both theoretically and empirically 
in order to advance organizational research (House, Rousseau & Thomas-Hunt, 1995). The 
structure is (typically) hierarchically nested so that higher-level units encompass those at lower 
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levels. The importance of identifying nested structures lies in the fact that observations within 
higher level units are more similar than across those units. Because lower level units share common 
features and influences from the higher level units, they are not independent from each other. For 
instance, there is variability between firms within alliances but also between alliances in terms of 
performance. Whereas certain alliances perform better than others, individual firms within each 
alliance may also experience different performance consequences. Neglecting to account for such 
nesting may lead to wrong conclusions if either of these sources of variability is ignored during 
(statistical) analysis. For example, multiple alliances formed by a firm can share some governance, 
management and performance practices. Similarly, multiple alliances located in a particular country 
(e.g., China) may have the same governance form due to idiosyncratic institutional characteristics of 
that country. Most empirical research does not account for the nested structure of the data and 
typically either simply controls for higher-level factors (e.g., industry or environmental effects) or 
treat them as same-level, independent variables. However, such treatment may lead to 
misspecifications and erroneous interpretations of results due, for example, to violation of the 
independence assumption underlying most regression models. 
 In research on strategic alliances, the focal unit of interest is typically either the alliance or 
the firm. For instance, research on alliance formation is preoccupied with identifying the factors 
determining the propensity to form alliances or the governance structure of the alliance.  The focal 
unit in the former is the firm as researchers seek to explain the variability in firm‘s propensity to 
form alliances, whereas in the latter the focal unit and the dependent variables are specified at the 
level of the alliance. Essentially, it is the dependent variable(s) of a particular study that determines 
the level of theory. Studies typically focus on a single alliance per firm or consider each alliance in 
isolation without accounting for the interdependence of alliances as part of a portfolio. Yet, 
managing a portfolio of alliances is likely to create value beyond what can be accomplished if each 
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alliance were managed separately (Heimeriks et al., 2007). Such additional value stems from 
homogeneity in the processes utilized to coordinate knowledge across the portfolio of alliances 
(Dyer & Hatch, 2006). To the extent that multiple alliances managed by a firm share some features, 
similar alliance processes (management practices) are likely to influence subsequent performance.  
Thus, it is necessary to account for this similarity between alliances within firms by explicitly 
modeling the nesting. At the same time, it is important to recognize that significant differences exist 
between multiple alliances managed by a firm and this heterogeneity needs to be modeled and 
explained as well. In terms of level of theory, measurement and analysis, this implies that a 
distinction must be made between constructs at each level (e.g., firm versus alliance) in order to 
model the variance at both alliance and firm level as well as the potential relationships across levels. 
As discussed earlier, collaborative advantage is made up by, at least, firm and interfirm level 
antecedents (as well as potentially individual level micro-foundational predictors and network, 
industry or country level macro-foundational influences) and is itself an antecedent to firm or 
alliance level performance. Depending on the focal unit of theory the theoretical building blocks of 
collaborative advantage may differ. For instance, if a study is preoccupied with explaining 
variability in firm-level performance as a function of a firm‘s collaborative advantage, the role of 
collaborative advantage is at the portfolio level and the researcher must consequently conceptualize 
and measure collaborative advantage as a function of the firm‘s ability to manage synergies across 
multiple alliances. Alternatively, studies that seek to explain how collaborative advantage 
contributes to alliance performance (for instance measured as JV performance or number of patents 
resulting from a particular alliance) must focus on firm-level attributes contributed by both (all) 
firms in the alliance. At the same time, a number of other variables at different levels may 
potentially influence the relationship between collaborative advantage and performance and the 
nature of such cross-level interactions is also likely to vary with the level of theory. For example, 
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while industry competitive rivalry may exert positive influence on the collaborative advantage-
performance relationship at the firm level, such interaction is less likely to be theoretically 
justifiable when the unit of theory is the alliance portfolio. Specification of such multilevel models 
may be accomplished in several ways and we now turn to a discussion of such specifications. 
Specifying Multilevel Collaborative Advantage Models  
To the extent that phenomena at one level impact those at another, cross-level theories may be 
more appropriate than single-level theories. One type of cross-level theoretical model specifies 
antecedent predictor variables and dependent outcome variables at different levels. In terms of 
modeling collaborative advantage, this may imply either conceptualizing various lower (or higher) 
level influences on the development of collaborative advantage or treating collaborative advantage 
as an antecedent variable of higher level outcomes. For instance, to the extent that collaborative 
advantage is conceived as a firm-level phenomenon (i.e. a firms ability to extract superior rents 
from it capability to manage collaborative relationships), a multilevel theoretical model may be 
specified where individual (e.g., alliance manager or gate-keeper), team (e.g., alliance team), firm 
(e.g., investment in alliance resources such as an alliance unit), and perhaps industry (e.g., 
technological change, industry structure or profitability) characteristics determine the amount of 
collaborative advantage. By the same token, if treated as an antecedent variable, multilevel models 
may specify how various measures of collaborative advantage influence firm or alliance 
performance.  
A second type of cross-level model is found in studies which include contextual factors as 
moderators of interfirm relationships. For instance, industry (e.g. dynamism or growth) and/or 
macro-environmental factors (e.g., country risk, protectionist legislation or environmental 
uncertainty) may moderate relationships between various antecedent variables and collaborative 
advantage or between collaborative advantage and performance. Appropriate specification (both 
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theoretically and empirically) of moderator variables at multiple levels may yield novel insights into 
the conditions under which certain established relationships hold or change. Indeed, such multilevel 
contingency models could be extended to include multiple factors at various levels simultaneously 
in order to bring alliance research closer to the complexity of alliance practice. While rare in extant 
literature, moderator variables from levels below the relationships they moderate are possible and 
may further advance the understanding of collaborative advantage. For instance, specific 
characteristics (e.g., demographic or psychological) of individual alliance managers or top 
management teams may influence the relation between antecedent variables and collaborative 
advantage or between collaborative advantage and various outcome variables, such as firm- or 
alliance performance.  
A particular type of multi-level models is concerned with patterns of relationships that can be 
replicated across levels of analysis. Such models describe relationships at one level that are 
generalizable to other levels - that is constructs and their relations are presumed to be meaningful 
across levels. In interfirm research, few such constructs have been specified, though a number of 
constructs are often treated (implicitly) as if they have such generalizable properties (e.g., trust). 
Collaborative advantage is a particularly ambiguous construct in terms of levels of theory and 
analysis and not specifying clearly how it translates from the organization to the interfirm 
relationship and beyond may blur the theoretical development and empirical analyses. As pointed 
out earlier, certain aspects of collaborative advantage may reside within the organizational 
boundaries, whereas others may be a function of relational interaction with alliance partners or 
indeed industry structure and competition. While the underlying assumption is that collaborative 
advantage characteristics are similar across analytical levels, very few studies specify and measure 
the extent to which the processes leading to firm-level collaborative advantage mirror those that 
lead to interfirm collaborative advantage, thereby increasing the risk of committing a ―cross-level 
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fallacy‖ (Rousseau, 1985). For instance, according to the resource-based view (RBV), firms are 
bundles of resources and competitive advantage is achieved by the effective management of internal 
resources (Barney, 1991). Since resources are heterogeneously distributed across firms, this 
perspective recognizes that some important internal resources can be obtained from external sources 
via alliances; however, by and large such theories neglect to stipulate the mechanisms by which 
firm level resources can affect and be affected by exchange between complex social systems, such 
as organizations. Such mechanisms are likely to influence the extent to which collaborative 
advantage, conceptualized and measured at the firm level, can be generalized to higher/lower levels.  
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
We began this chapter by noting the vague and unclear status of the notion of collaborative 
advantage. However, as is often the case with fuzzy concepts in social science, collaborative 
advantage captures relevant and important phenomena. Accordingly, we set out to proffer a 
clarification of the construct, attempting to define the meaning of collaborative advantage as an 
inherently and inescapably multilevel phenomenon, whose potential value rests on the theoretical 
and methodological clarity and rigor of researchers applying it. If an elusive and ambiguous 
construct such as collaborative advantage is to become useful in management and social science 
research, there is a great need to adequately define its theoretical borders; the scope conditions; 
semantic relationships to other related constructs; and the logical consistency of argumentation 
(Suddaby, 2010). Given the multilevel nature of collaborative advantage, levels of theory, 
measurement and analysis must be aligned in order to ensure construct clarity and avoid model 
misspecifications and empirical misinterpretations. Specifically, careful attention must be paid to 
the level of theory from which multilevel constructs, such as collaborative advantage, belong and 
determine to what extent relationships among variables generalize across levels before data is 
collected and subjected to statistical analysis. Hence, we contend that future research on 
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collaborative advantage must start by addressing the fundamental issues of defining and clarifying 
the construct in terms of levels of theory, measurement and analysis outlined in this chapter.  
This is particularly pertinent, given a certain amount of ―levels confusion‖ in the literature: 
Presumably because of its general and intuitive appeal (i.e., any advantage to any actor that arises 
because of collaboration), collaborative advantage has been treated as an unproblematic construct 
that can be applied almost at will at any level of analysis (from the level of collaborating individuals 
to collaborating nations). We have criticized this, suggesting that in much research collaborative 
advantage is applied to levels where it may not make conceptual/logical sense. For example, we 
have questioned whether it makes sense to ascribe collaborative advantage to e.g., a national system 
of innovation. More fundamentally, this suggests that, extreme care should be taken when applying 
constructs developed for one level of theory to another one. Not only may constructs not be 
applicable to any level of theory, the underlying causal mechanisms may differ when traversing 
levels.    
In spite of a long history of recognizing that organizational phenomena unfold within 
complex and dynamic systems, management research and organizational science often ignores the 
multilevel dynamics of these social systems. The system is typically divided into industry, alliance, 
organization, team, and individual level subparts, each part the providence of different disciplines, 
theories, perspectives and approaches. As a result, coherent research on organizational phenomena 
as integrated systems spanning multiple levels of theory, measurement and analysis are scarce, 
constituting a critical omission in the progression of organizational and management science.   
 This chapter has outlined important multilevel issues pertaining to research on collaborative 
advantage. Our aim was to highlight fundamental issues of construct clarity in relation to 
collaborative advantage. In this regard, we highlighted on the issues of specification of levels of 
theory, measurement and analysis. Our chapter has brought to focus the importance of adequately 
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defining the meaning of collaborative advantage construct as well as illustrated the profound 
implications of adequately specifying the nested structure of the collaborative advantage 
phenomenon. Multilevel research—research examining the extent and correlates of variability in 
both antecedents and consequences of collaborative advantage at multiple levels—holds great 
promise for advancing this area of research. Thus, although we have issued a series of 
methodological warnings and have offered a mild criticism of what we see as a tendency to 
indiscriminately transfer constructs (and claims about causal mechanisms) about levels of 
theory/analysis, the other side of the coin is that multi-level research on collaborative advantage 
offers significant potential for interesting future research questions. In particular, the attention of 
researchers is directed to potentially novel explanatory mechanisms and independent variables at 
different levels. For example, in the context of alliance research, it may be quite useful to consider 
variables typically addressed in the national innovation systems literature, such as specific national 
policies and institutional arrangements. Such variables must be theoretically specified (in the sense 
of accounting for their moderating, mediating, or direct impact on collaborative advantage) and 
empirically modeled (in the sense that level of measurement matches level of analysis). 
 As we close this chapter, we issue a final warning regarding future research on collaborative 
advantage; despite its intuitive appeal, collaborative advantage must be better grounded 
theoretically in order to realize its potential as an informative social science construct. Such 
theoretical grounding may start with construct clarification, however, should move beyond pure 
descriptive properties of what collaborative advantage is to include considerations of how (the 
relationship to other constructs), when (the contextual conditions), and why (the causal 
mechanisms) (Bacharach, 1989) collaborative advantage matters. Indeed, we suggest that multilevel 
theorizing may be a vehicle to help clarify the boundaries, contingencies and interdependent nature 
of collaborative advantage and move research forward. 
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